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Introduction  
The Australian Procurement and Construction Council (APCC) (2001) noted that Australian 
government assets, such as buildings, roads, rail and utilities, are valued at around $371billion and 
approximately $18 billion is spent annually by state, territory and commonwealth governments on 
acquiring and maintaining these assets. Ferguson (2007) estimates that over $200 billion will be 
spent on engineering assets such as transport (roads and rail), ports, utilities (water and electricity) 
and broadband in the next few years in Australia.  Such engineering assets are highly complex 
arrangements which comprise social and technical systems, are capital intensive, and typically last 
for significant lengths of time (Herder and Verwater-Lukszo 2006).  Indeed it is considered that the 
optimal functioning of engineering assets such as “transportation, energy, information and 
communication, and water is vital for the economy and society” (Herder and Verwater-Lukszo 
2006, 119). Engineering assets are thus significant in both economic and social terms (APCC 
2001).  
 
Recognising the importance of engineering assets to society, many jurisdictions in Australia have 
developed policies on the strategic management of engineering assets (e.g. Queensland Treasury 
2003, Western Australia Department of Treasury and Finance 2005) particularly in order to guide 
the procurement of assets, asset management and maintenance, which is now typically achieved 
through private firms. The APCC (2001) has argued that the effective and efficient management of 
these assets is in the best interest of government, business and society (APCC 2001). As an 
emerging field of endeavour, engineering asset management seeks to optimise the performance of 
these engineering assets – particularly the whole-of-life management of risks and expenditures for 
the purpose of achieving organisational goals (British Standards 2003). Given the relative newness 
of the field, much research is still needed in order to identify the optimal ways of procuring 
engineering asset management and maintenance from the private sector by government (Lædre, 
Austeng, Haugen and Kaklegg 2006).  
 
Procuring engineering asset management and maintenance is a critical arena in which to conduct 
research due to the size of expenditure involved in acquiring and maintaining these assets (APCC 
2001), the typical longevity of the assets, and the significant risk posed to society if these assets 
were to fail (Herder and Verwater-Lukso 2006). This paper argues that a richer understanding of 
the procurement of engineering asset management and maintenance services can be achieved by 
using perspectives from complex adaptive systems theory. The following sections outline the 
administrative challenges faced by governments as they seek to arrange for the management and 
maintenance of these assets, as these arrangements are of central interest to this research 
project. Firstly, the complex public policy issues which have arisen due to new systems of 
government in western democracies will be outlined, together with drawing out the implications of 
these arrangements for engineering asset management. Theoretical perspectives which have been 
deployed to explore this complexity will then be surveyed, and the utility of complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) theory to investigate the procurement of engineering asset management will be 
advanced.  
 
Overview of public policy issues relevant to engineering asset management  
The management of government services, such as engineering asset management, was 
historically conducted by public agencies with in-house staff, occasionally supplemented by 
external consultants, with ongoing maintenance undertaken for the most part by in-house 
workforces (Hood 1991). In the early 1990’s significant changes were introduced into western 
democracies under the rubric of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991). One of the main 
changes which occurred under NPM was that those tasks which had been conducted previously in-
house were contracted-out to the private sector (Domberger 1994). ‘Contracting-out’, as it came to 
be known, fundamentally changed the nature of service delivery for government agencies 
(Verspaandonk, 2001), as government moved from delivering services directly, to contracting with 
the private sector for the delivery of these services.  
 
The introduction of NPM greatly increased the complexity of public services, as it required the 
development of new sets of relationships between government and the private sector for the 
delivery of specific services (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003). Under NPM Government ceased to 
provide many services directly to the public and instead engaged the services of private firms to 
deliver, manage and maintain these assets and services on behalf of government (Rhodes 1997). 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) note that these new arrangements necessitated a shift in thinking 
within government away from ‘rowing’ (or doing the work) to ‘steering’ (which involved managing 
and guiding others who work on behalf of government). As a consequence of these changes, 
governments of all persuasions are still attempting to find the optimal set of arrangements for 
planning, tendering, contracting and managing the services of numerous private firms (Rhodes 
1997), including those who have been contracted to provide the delivery and maintenance of 
engineering assets (Lædre, et al. 2006). The process of sourcing goods and services by third 
parties is typically referred to by government as ‘procurement’. As outlined by the APCC (2003, 2):  
 
Procurement takes many forms and encompasses the acquisition of consumables 
(goods); real property; capital equipment such as computers; built assets such as 
hospitals, schools, roads and major facilities; and services such as office 
accommodation, cleaning and security. 
 
The interest of this paper is the procurement of engineering assets, which due to their size, 
complexity, longevity and potential impact on society if mismanaged, involves a different set of 
arrangements when compared to procuring smaller disposable items – such as office supplies. 
 
Procurement of engineering assets is in essence a series of decisions about the delivery system, 
contract model and compensation format for the management and maintenance of a given asset 
(Lædre et al. 2006). Numerous delivery systems exist in public policy documents which delineate 
the overarching relationship between the contractor and government, such as managing 
contractor, alliance contract, or period contract (New South Wales Government 2005). A variety of 
contract systems exist which establish the range of services being procured from the private sector 
for a particular asset, such as construct only; design and construct; or design, construct and 
maintain (New South Wales Government 2005). Numerous funding options also exist. Having 
determined the need for the asset, a department typically then justifies the need of the asset in 
order to meet service obligations to society, and includes such plans in forward budget estimates 
(e.g. Queensland Treasury 2003). The funding for the asset thus becomes part of intra-
governmental negotiations over budgetary spending. The actual funding source for a specific asset 
can be derived from a range of government and private sources (New South Wales Government 
2005), as well as from a number of levels of government (Furneaux and Brown 2007b). Thus there 
are several pathways available for the procurement of engineering assets – including multiple 
forms of contractual relationships and compensation formats possible in the delivery of 
infrastructure procurement, with no single best method apparent (Lædre, et al. 2006). Such issues 
are important as they relate to the efficiency and effectiveness of contractual and financial 
mechanisms in achieving outcomes for government. Limited literature exists on the appropriate 
types of procurement arrangements for particular classes or types of asset, and mechanisms 
which are appropriate for specific situations, which this research seeks to address. As will be 
outlined below, CAS theory has been advocated as providing a useful framework for the 
examination of these complex sets of arrangements (Bovaird 2006).   
 
The importance of ensuring engineering assets achieve their intended outcomes in an effective 
and efficient manner, has meant that asset management practitioner literature has tended to focus 
on the economic and technical decision making processes which are required for the effective 
whole-of-life management of these assets (e.g. INGENIUM  2002), although attention to the whole 
of life aspects of these large assets – especially the disposal of these assets – is only recently 
being addressed (e.g. APCC 2007) . Engineering assets deliver critical services to the wider 
community, such as the generation of electricity, provision of water, and national defence (Herder 
and Verwater-Lukszo 2006), and the failure, neglect or sabotage of these engineering assets could 
result in significant adverse outcomes for society as a whole (Hellström 2007; Godau 1999).  
 
McIntyre and Pradhan (2003) and Goadau (1999) both argue that engineering systems such as 
energy generation have for too long been considered as purely technological systems, and argue 
that engineering assets include social, political, economic, and environmental factors. Herder and 
Verwater-Lukszo (2006), argue for example, that engineering assets are not just pieces of 
technology, but are really socio-technical systems – consisting of both a social and a technical 
element – and note that the organisational and social context of engineering asset operations is 
seldom investigated in research to date. This research project explicitly addresses this gap in the 
literature by focusing on the range of organisations involved in making decisions concerning 
engineering assets as these form key stakeholders who should be consulted when making 
decisions concerning critical pieces of infrastructure (Mitchell, Agle and Wood 1997). As Bridgman 
and Davis (2004) suggest, public policy arenas “can be a chaotic place in which ideas must find a 
path between the intentions of politicians, the interests of various government institutions, the 
interpretation of bureaucrats and the intervention of pressure groups, media and citizens”.  
Research into engineering assets therefore needs to look beyond the economic and technical 
aspects of procurement to the wider social, political and environmental context in which the asset 
is situated. As CAS theory explicitly looks both at the behaviour of agents within a system, and how 
the external environment of the system affects agents within the system, it would appear to be a 
suitable framework for addressing the gap identified here.  
 
In summary, engineering asset procurement is concerned with the planning, delivery and 
maintenance of large assets which involves significant expenditure, and is integral to the 
functioning of modern industrial societies (Herder and Verwater-Lukso 2006). Current practices 
have emerged out of a raft of major changes in the public sector which meant that services once 
provided by government on behalf of society were contracted out to the private sector to deliver on 
behalf of government (Hood 1991). Procurement is in essence a series of decisions about an 
engineering asset which should consider technical, economic, political and social factors (McIntyre 
and Pradhan 2003). Many governments are still searching for the most appropriate way to procure 
engineering assets and provide an optimal system of management and maintenance (Lædre, et al. 
2006), as well as how to govern the ongoing relationships between government and private 
industry (Rhodes 1997, 48) which are required for the effective delivery and maintenance of these 
assets. As Jensen and Stonecash (2004, 22) note “Despite its importance as a public policy issue 
and the amount of research devoted to it, the determinants of successful public sector outsourcing 
are still largely unknown”. This paper will address this gap in the literature by examining the 
procurement of engineering asset management and maintenance by government from private 
firms.  
 
Potential theoretical frameworks for exploring engineering asset procurement  
Approaches prevalent in the academic literature relevant to the examination of procurement issues 
in the public sector are principal-agent theory (Quiggin 1986) and network governance (Keast, 
Brown and Mandell 2007). More recently, however CAS theory has been mooted as theory that 
can extend network perspectives of government services (Klijn and Teisman 2007). These are 
discussed further below.  
 
Principal-agent theory has been a dominant theory in the analysis of government engagement with 
construction and infrastructure industries. Much of the principal-agent theory literature has 
focussed on the relationship between the owners and managers of firms – particularly the 
contractual relationship which is used to reduce risk, and to control opportunistic behaviour, 
although it has also been applied to relationships between organisations (Eisenhardt 1989). As 
government is a purchaser of buildings, construction and design firms are seen as the agents of 
government, who is typically perceived as the principal (Quiggin 1996). Agency theory postulates 
that people are self-interested at the personal level, and therefore have conflicts of interest in some 
cooperative endeavours unless these relationships are mediated by arm’s length third party 
transactions (Jensen 1994). Hence this theory has tended to focus on the specification of details in 
contracts in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour by firms contracted to provide services to 
government.    
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) principal-agent theory only represents a partial and adversarial 
view of the world, and ignores a great deal of complexity in society, and in the business 
environment. Part of the complexity is that government can have multiple roles in construction 
projects such as “assessor of infrastructure needs, project manager, facilitator, performance 
sector, network planner, concession granter, inspector, contract manager, protector of the 
environment, and representative of the public interest” (Demirag 2004: 23). Increasingly funds for 
major projects are drawn from multiple spheres of government, which means that contractors have 
to meet the rules and regulations of two tiers of governments in order to be eligible to tender for 
contracts (Brown, Furneaux, Janssen and Allan 2008). Further complexity emerges as multiple 
departments may become involved in the planning and delivery stages of a project either directly 
(Furneaux, Brown, McConville, McFallan, London and Burgess 2006a), or indirectly as multiple 
outcomes are achieved from the procurement process, such as training, regional development and 
even art delivered as a percentage of the construction project (Austen, Seymour, Brown, Furneaux 
and McCabe 2007) or occupational health and safety (Brown et al. 2008).  Simple notions of 
principal and agent do not allow for the sheer number and diversity of roles that government can 
play in individual engineering asset management projects. Eisner, Worsham, and Ringquist (1996) 
argue that agency theory cannot be applied to complex modern bureaucracies as there are 
simultaneously multiple agents and multiple principals engaged in the policy making process. In 
their review of engineering asset management and maintenance Herder and Verwater-Lukszo 
(2006, 119) argue that “new and more intelligent methods are needed … that are able to handle 
multi-actor, multi-level, multi-objective and dynamic complexity of infrastructural operation”. 
 
Principal-agent theory has been held to provide significant explanatory power for exploring 
government contracting, particularly in circumstances which involve fairly straight-forward, and 
easily measured arrangements between government and contracted firms (Jensen and Stonecash 
2004). Given the difficulty for principal-agent theory in dealing with a multiplicity of parties involved 
in modern procurement arrangements (Eisner, Worsham and Ringquist 1996) such as that which 
exists with engineering asset management (Herder and Verwater-Lukso 2006), alternative theories 
are needed which can advance ways of understanding the interactions between the actors.  One 
such theory which has gained considerable attention in recent years is that of ‘network 
governance’.  
 
Considerable work has been undertaken in recent years to explore the new area of ‘network 
governance’ (e.g. Keast, Brown and Mandell 2007). Network governance is interested in the 
networks of agents which are held to exist across most areas of government activity, including the 
procurement of the management and maintenance of engineering assets (Osborn and Hegedoorn 
1997). While NPM introduced delivery by the market of services for government, this did not mean 
that hierarchy disappeared, as firms were still accountable to government and government was 
accountable to society. Instead, in addition to hierarchy and market forms of organising the 
economy, NPM resulted in networks of relationships between suppliers and government 
developing (Keast, Mandell, and Brown 2006). Consequently hierarchy, market and network forms 
of economic relationships co-existed in western economies (Rhodes 1997, 48), which resulted in 
increased complexity due to overlapping of multiple policy domains (Keast, Mandell, and Brown 
2006).  
 
While the notion of networks, markets and hierarchies as modes of governance is not new, Rhodes 
(1997) argues that it is the mix of these arrangements in public service contexts which matters. 
Recent work has focused on the optimal mix of modes of governance in order to deliver services 
and products (Provan and Kenis 2007), and the importance of different types of networks 
(cooperation, coordination, collaboration) for different situations (Keast, Brown and Mandell 2007). 
Network governance research has begun to advance understandings of how to influence network 
structure, interaction and outcomes (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006; Provan and Kenis 2007), and the 
extent to which these networks can be governed (Kooiman 1999). While principal-agent theory is 
held to not cope with the multiple agents prevalent in the procurement of services by government, 
Keast, Mandell, and Brown (2006) argue that network governance is able to accommodate multiple 
agents and objectives prevalent in modern service delivery arrangements. Despite its power and 
capability of demonstrating interactions between various agents in networked arrangements, Smith 
and Stacey (1997) argue, however, that such approaches can overlook an important factor – the 
mixed governance modes of network, hierarchy and market in specific situations will not remain 
stable but will adapt and evolve and tensions between mixed governance modes will generate new 
forms of organisation. Klijn and Teisman (2007) agree, also noting that both the governance 
system and its environment are constantly changing, and that complexity theory helps to explain 
the way that agents, systems and environments interact and produce change. It is this area of 
evolution, emergence and adaptation which CAS theory is held to provide a powerful alternative 
perspective to network governance (White 2001). Pierce (2000), Blackman (2001), and Chapman 
(2002) have likewise called for CAS research into public policy issues, arguing that this perspective 
provides a highly useful alternative perspective to other theoretical approaches.  
 
Network governance literature explores alternative modes of governing the sets of relationships 
involved in the delivery of services to the network, thereby influencing the outcome of the network 
(Klijn and Koppenjan 2006). Proponents of CAS agree with network theorists that hierarchical 
approaches to management of complex delivery systems are generally not successful (Rhodes 
and MacKechnie 2003).  Part of the reason for this, according to CAS theory, is that order emerges 
from the system itself, and that order cannot be imposed externally, as the system will always find 
ways of adapting to such external controls and minimising their influence (Holland 1998). Thus 
while a system and a network may appear similar, the means for creating order is perceived 
differently.   
 
Other authors researching in the area of engineering asset management argue that it is imperative 
to examine engineering assets from a CAS perspective due to the inter-related nature of the 
systems, and their importance to modern societies (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001). Price 
and Akhlaghi (1999) and Herder and Verwater-Lukszo (2006) have also argued that engineering 
asset management needs to be examined from a CAS perspective in order to address the 
demands of multiple stakeholders. This is achieved by examining the range of agents involved in 
the system. Godau (1999) argues that traditional approaches to managing engineering assets do 
not address the conflicting needs of technical, economic, managerial, environmental, political and 
social agents, and argues that a CAS perspective is needed to take into consideration all of these 
agendas. An improved understanding of the dynamics of these systems is likely to lead to a better 
understanding of how to manage the problems encountered within these systems (Smith and 
Stacey 1997).  
 
Despite all of these calls, Richardson (2006) suggests that CAS as a theory has only newly been 
applied to real world public policy problems. Klijn and Teisman (2007) agree arguing that there 
have been relatively few applications of CAS theory to public policy problems. These perspectives 
are summarised by Parsons: 
 
The application of complex adaptive systems to social systems is fairly recent 
and … appears to hold promise for helping us to work within the complexity of 
today’s world (Parsons 2007, 407).     
 
Published reports using CAS as a theoretical approach have been found in a variety of public 
policy areas including: community involvement (Midgley and Richardson 2007), drug trade (Coyle 
and Alexander 1997), federalism (Coghill 2004), health care and public health (Bar-Yam 2006; 
Vennix and Gubbels 1992; White 2000), international development agencies (Smith and Stacey 
1997), occupational health and safety (Koppenjan 2001), security services (Meek de Ladurantey 
and Newell 2007), sustainable development (Daneke 2001; Moxnes 2000) and tobacco excise 
(Cavana and Clifford 2006). Each of these studies have begun to deploy CAS theory as a 
framework for examining specific public policy problems.  CAS theories have also been applied to 
marketing (Markose 2005; Wollin and Perry 2004) and economics (Robson 2005). Thus while CAS 
theory is relatively new to public policy research (Klijn and Teisman 2007) numerous authors are 
now beginning to apply this theoretical framework to explore a variety of public policy issues. Such 
calls are not restricted to investigation of general policy matters, but have also emerged specifically 
in the area of government procurement.  
 
While CAS theory has been held to provide a very useful framework for evaluating the 
appropriateness of policy initiatives in general (Sanderson 2000), some researchers have also 
used CAS theory to explore public procurement. One study in the United Kingdom focuses on the 
various forms of market relationships possible in procurement of government services (Bovaird 
2006). Bovaird (2006) argues that CAS theory is a useful theoretical perspective to understand 
procurement as it provides a framework for examining multiple agents, their relationships, the rules 
they utilised to make decisions and how these decisions can affect the system overall. Hitchins 
(2003) also argues that CAS theory is useful in understanding how government procurement 
arrangements can affect the market, and in turn are affected by the market. Klijn and Teisman 
(2007) in their exploration of CAS theory use a case study of the procurement of rail management 
and maintenance services in the United Kingdom. They found the theory useful in identifying the 
key agents in the system (government and private) and the impact of decisions made by these key 
agents on the capability of the system (rail) being managed.  
 
In summary, engineering asset management is a significant area of research, as engineering 
assets involve considerable expenditure by government, and are of critical importance for the 
effective functioning of modern societies. Such arrangements involve complex sets of decisions 
concerning funding, contracting, and relationships, (Lædre, et al. 2006) and involve the 
management of multi-agents and multi-objectives (Herder and Verwater-Lukszo (2006, 119).  
Numerous authors (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001; Price and Akhlaghi 1999; Herder and 
Verwater-Lukszo 2006; Godau 1999) have argued that engineering assets should be investigated 
from a complex adaptive perspective. Bovaird (2006) has specifically argued that CAS theory 
provides a very useful perspective for the examination of government procurement.  
 
Engineering asset procurement is an important area which appears to have not been studied 
extensively from a CAS perspective to date. This research seeks to expand current literature on 
the procurement of engineering asset management, by using a CAS perspective, which numerous 
authors argue is important (Smith and Stacey 1997) and will result in improved understanding and 
therefore improved management of engineering assets.   
Area and topic 
This paper will develop and validate a framework for analysing engineering asset procurement 
from a CAS perspective, which takes into consideration both conceptually and methodologically 
the complexity associated with the procurement of engineering assets. In short it seeks to develop 
a richer understanding of engineering asset procurement using CAS theory as a theoretical 
framework. A better understanding of the dynamics of such a system should in turn result in better 
management, maintenance and long-term decision making for asset management.  
 
The topic is thus situated in the broad area of public policy. However, a CAS perspective will be 
utilised to examine a public policy issue: engineering asset procurement.  
 
Literature Review  
This section provides an overview of CAS theory, and how this theory provides a useful conceptual 
framework for examining public procurement of engineering asset management services. Having 
initially explored CAS, together with some challenges involved with the deployment and 
operationalisation of the theory in management contexts, specific research questions, problem 
specification and significance of the study are detailed.     
Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
Complexity is concerned with phenomena which cannot be easily explained by positivistic scientific 
methods (Haynes 2007). As has been noted above, CAS is a promising line of research for this 
study as it provides a framework which accommodates the complexity of public sector procurement 
(Bovaird 2006), the engineering assets which are procured (Herder and Verwater-Lukszo 2006), 
and the emergent, changing nature of modern governance arrangements (Klijn and Teisman 2007; 
Meek, de Ladurantey and Newell 2007) which are required to care for such assets.   
 
Systems’ thinking is a way of understanding and investigating complexity, and CAS theory is now 
regarded as a strong candidate for providing a unifying notion of complexity (Chu, Strand and 
Jelland 2003, 19). This paper will use CAS theory as a way of initiating and guiding thinking about 
the procurement of engineering asset management (Richardson 2005a). This is in line with other 
public policy research which posits CAS theory as providing a framework for analysis that is 
beyond a mere metaphor, and instead that it provides  “a conceptual framework, a way of thinking 
and a way of seeing the world” (Mitleton-Kelly 2003, 26).    
 
There is no one theory concerning CAS (Mitleton-Kelly  2003), but rather several theories arising 
from the studies in a variety of sciences. The following definition will be used in this paper:   
 
A complex adaptive system consists of a large and diverse 
number of agents that interact in nonlinear and adaptive 
ways. In a densely intertwined web of interacting agents … 
each agent is responding to other agents and the 
environment as a whole; it is continually adapting in the 
context of its relationships with other agents (Parsons 2007, 
406).  
 
While there are various perspectives on complexity, this paper will utilise CAS as a conceptual 
framework for examining engineering asset procurement.   
 
While application of CAS theory to public policy arenas has been held to improve the 
understanding and performance of organisational systems, considerable work is needed to apply 
this concept to organisational contexts in general (Anderson 1999), and to public service 
arrangements, in particular (Daneke 2005).   
 
Difficulties in applying CAS to procurement of engineering assets  
Whetten (1989) argues that bringing a perspective into management from another field can be a 
fruitful way of developing new theoretical understanding. It is important to note in this regard that 
CAS theory originated in the fields of physics and biology. In physics for example “after three 
hundred years of dissecting everything into molecules and atoms nuclei and quarks, [scientists] … 
were starting to look at how those pieces go together into complex wholes” (Waldrop 1992, 16). 
Likewise in biology “where people had spent the last twenty years laying bare the molecular 
mechanisms of DNA, and proteins, and all the other components of the cell. Now they were also 
beginning to grapple with the essential mystery: how can several quadrillion such molecules 
organize themselves into an entity that moves, that responds, that reproduces, that is alive?” 
(Waldrop 1992, 16). Thus, CAS theory, which has its origins in physics, chemistry, biology and 
computational studies, may well provide novel and interesting perspectives which can improve our 
theoretical understanding (Whetten 1989), provide significant advancement in our understanding of 
procurement (Bovaird 2006) and provide insights into engineering assets such as rail (Klijn and 
Teisman 2007).   
 
Mitleton-Kelly (2003) sounds a note of caution however, arguing that while the elements of 
systems of atomic particles may bear some resemblance to activities in organisations, there are 
also critical differences which need to be acknowledged – particularly the ability of people in 
organisations to reflect, learn and behave in ways that are not entirely predictable. Griffin and 
Shaw (2000) agree, contending that systems thinking is inappropriate for modelling the activities of 
human systems, as humans can choose between a variety of options, and their actions cannot be 
predicted with absolute certainty. Ball (2005) is more optimistic arguing that CAS thinking can 
provide a framework which enables comprehension of non-linear relationships typical in complex 
systems.  
 
Introna (2003) has suggested that a way forward to the application of CAS theories to 
organisational research is to begin with some of the insights from the parent domain, and examine 
their applicability through empirical work, which could lead to novel understandings of social 
systems, and possibly ways of intervening in them. Eisenhardt (2002) argues that such constructs 
would still need to be tested in order to demonstrate their validity. Daneke (2005) agrees, noting 
there are significant opportunities for the application of systems thinking to public administration. 
 
As noted above, CAS theory has been advocated as an important perspective which can be used 
to develop a better understanding of engineering assets (Smith and Stacey 1997), and government 
procurement (Bovaird 2007), and has been demonstrated as holding utility for the interaction 
between government procurement of engineering assets and the market (Hitchins 2003). These 
need to be tested, particularly given the relatively recent application of the theory to public policy 
problems (Klijn and Teisman 2007). As will be discussed later, the utility of CAS theory to 
understand government procurement of engineering asset management will be explored through a 
number of case studies.   
Problem  
There is considerable complexity involved in the procurement of engineering assets, and with the 
increased attention being paid to these assets by the public, government and industry alike, a 
study of the elements of the procurement system is timely. In addition, while various studies have 
examined specific aspects or elements of the procurement system, relatively few have examined 
procurement in its entirety – from a CAS perspective. This study will be of value to governments 
seeking a framework for making decisions concerning engineering assets, for industry seeking to 
engage with government, and for professional associations and education institutions which may 
wish to train staff in decision making processes under conditions of deep uncertainty.  
 
Numerous authors have argued that CAS theory provides a powerful analytical device for 
examining and exploring complex phenomena (Parsons 2007, 407) for public policy issues in 
general (Klijn and Teisman 2007; Meek de Ladurantey and Newell 2007; Richardson 2006) 
engineering asset management (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001; Smith and Stacey 1997; 
Price and Akhlaghi 1999; Herder and Verwater-Lukszo 2006; Godau 1999), and the procurement 
of services such as engineering asset management (Klein and Teisman 2007). The application of 
CAS to social systems however, is fairly recent and there are many disagreements about how to 
apply these concepts (Parsons 2007). Considerable work is needed to apply CAS theory to 
organisational systems, particularly the operationalising and modelling of such concepts (Anderson 
1999), and the testing of the theory in multiple cases in order to demonstrate and develop the 
application of the theory to public policy (Daneke 2005).   
Statement of purpose  
The purpose of this study then is to examine the procurement of engineering assets from a CAS 
perspective. Such analysis will seek to identify the agents, their roles and interaction; the rules 
which underlie the system, and the mechanisms by which such systems change and adapt, and 
are affected by their environment. Such research is exploratory (Babbie 2004) and is the first stage 
in developing a formal model of the procurement system of engineering assets. The purpose of this 
activity is in order to test the validity of CAS theory as a suitable framework for understanding the 
behaviour of government procurement from a systems perspective. By demonstrating the utility of 
CAS to explore the procurement of engineering asset management, the management, 
maintenance and long-term decision making for asset management is enhanced. 
 
Given the relative newness of this perspective to organisational studies in general, and public 
policy in particular, the research will demonstrate the utility of systems thinking by examining a 
specific area of government activity (procurement) in a specific area of this activity (engineering 
assets).   
Operationalising CAS research in public policy contexts  
As noted earlier, an important process in developing an understating of a CAS is to develop a 
model of the system (Holland 1998). The development of a model of a public policy problem as a 
CAS, has been acknowledged as posing considerable difficulty (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003). 
Chu et al. (2003, 27)  agree arguing that the sheer complexity of a public policy problems, and the 
number of agents involved, makes the modelling of public policy areas as CAS very difficult to 
model.  
 
As a way forward around this dilemma, and in order to apply the concept of CAS to procurement of 
engineering assets, it is prudent to firstly detail the elements, components and principles which are 
held to be part of all systems. This approach is particularly important if the CAS is used as a 
framework for thinking and analysis, not merely as a metaphor (Mitleton-Kelly 2003). As a first 
step, the core elements of a CAS must be described, and how this might be operationalised in this 
research project.   
 
Firstly what is a public policy system? Rhodes and MacKechnie propose that: 
 
Public service systems consist of multiple organizations engaged in the provision of a 
specific set of goods and services that are of value to the majority of consumer-citizens 
(Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003, 61).  
 
In order to apply the concept of CAS to procurement of engineering assets, it is prudent to firstly 
detail the elements, components and principles which are held to be part of all systems. As a first 
step then, the core elements of a CAS must firstly be educed. Once this has been achieved, an 
initial outline detailing how such elements might be operationalised in examining the procurement 
of engineering assets is undertaken.  
 
Given the newness of the field (Parsons 2007) it is important to build on and expand existing 
empirical and theoretical foundations. Consequently, this paper identifies and those elements 
which are common in most papers on CAS as applied to organisations and public policy systems 
(eg Anderson 1999, Mittleton-Kelly 2003, Rhodes and Mackechnie 2003, Anderson et al, 2005, 
Klijn 2008). These are:  
 
o Agents who interact according to schemata 
o Self-organisation (also termed emergence) 
o Co-evolution 
o Adaptation, evolution and recombination  
 
These elements are discussed in more detail below: 
Agents who interact according to rules (schema)  
Rather than approaching complex systems by reducing them to a set of causal variables, CAS 
models can show how complex outcomes flow from the interaction of agents based on a set of 
simple rules or schemata (Anderson 1999). The identification of agents is considered the first step 
in any CAS study1 (Holland 1995). For organisational researchers, agents can be identified as 
individuals, groups, or coalitions of groups (Anderson 1999, 219).  
 
For this research it is proposed that the main agents in a procurement system can be largely 
segmented into two groups according to their influence on the decision making process – direct 
and indirect. Direct agents include government agencies involved in the procurement process, and 
the firms involved in the planning, delivery and maintenance of specific assets. Indirect agents 
would be those who seek to influence the decision making process, but have no direct involvement 
in the decision itself. These include policy advisors, and political lobby groups. In terms familiar 
with public policy literature, these would be known as policy networks and delivery networks. An 
incomplete list is provided below:  
 
Table 1 - Initial list of actors involved in procurement systems  
Direct  Indirect  
Government  Private  Government  Private  
Procurement units 
Clients 
Politicians  
Principal contractors 
Sub contractors 
(many of these are on pre-
Policy officers  
Ministerial advisors  
Policy networks  
Advocacy groups 
Lobby groups 
                                                          
1 Some authors in the literature use the term actors to refer to individual elements of a Complex Adaptive System. This paper will use 
the alternative term agent instead, as often individuals act as agents for their organisation.   
qualified supplier databases) 
  
A complete list would require full analysis of prequalification schemes, and research methods for 
eliciting the key agents in the system, such as snowball sampling in interview. The interaction 
between these agents is determined according to the ‘rules of the system’ which are discussed in 
the next section.  
 
Interaction according to rules 
Often an approach to studying organisations is to identify independent and dependant variables at 
the same level of analysis in order to demonstrate cause-and-effect relationships. CAS theory 
approaches this differently, by asking how changes in the rules of agents, or the interaction 
between agents, result in outcomes for the system as a whole (Anderson 1999). That individuals 
use rules to make decisions is reflected in the notion that agents have frames of reference or 
schemata (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003) by which they interpret and evaluate information (Kiljn 
and Teisman 2007). These schemata include an understanding of how the world, people, 
organisations and procedures work (Wolf 2005, 187).  
 
Rules provide codes of meaning that facilitate the interpretation of ambiguous 
worlds. They embody collective and individual roles, identities, rights and 
obligations, interests, values worldviews, and memory, and thus constrain the 
allocation of attention, standards of evaluation, priorities, perceptions and 
resources (Olsen 2005, p.9).  
 
From a symbolic interaction perspective individual agents struggle to control shared interpretation; 
roles and rules are negotiations and gambits in the struggle to define and construct meaning 
(Anderson 1999). For leading CAS authors such as Gell-Mann (1994) it is precisely this capability 
of being able to create schemata that distinguishes CAS from other complex systems such as 
galaxies. In fact, CAS can have many competing schemata which compete against each other – 
the ones that prove to be most salient are the ones that are reinforced (Holland 1995).   From a 
public policy perspective: 
 
making sense of contemporary public administration then, requires and understanding of 
the complex ecology of institutions, actors, rules, values, principles, goals, interests, beliefs, 
powers and cleavages in which it operates (Olsen 2005, p7). 
 
Holland (1995) contends that rules can be classified into two main types – rules which regulate the 
action of agents, and rules about the system itself. This point is echoed by Klijn (2001, 2007) 
suggesting that in public policy systems there are rules which focus on the policy arena itself 
(arena rules), and those which relate to the interaction of agents in a network (interaction rules). 
This can be demonstrated in the following table:  
 
Table 2 – Main types of rules in policy systems (adapted from Klijn 2001, 2007)  
 Description  Aspects Examples 
Access to policy game 
(who may enter the 
game, exit options, 
etc) 
Pre-qualified supplier 
arrangements 
Institutional 
arrangements for 
procurement  
Interaction rules Rules which regulate 
agents interactions  
Interaction in policy 
game (what is 
permitted or not in 
interactions) 
Conflict 
Information 
Reality (what agents 
consider as core 
business or quality) 
Identity of agents 
Product rules  
System rules Rules which regulate 
the setting or policy 
arena  
Payoff (costs and 
benefits for agents) 
Status 
Evaluation criteria 
Positions (positions of 
agents and relations 
between positions) 
Status 
Power 
 
Like other elements of CAS theory, the notion of agent decision making based upon rules is not 
totally new to public management, as March and Simon have argued (1993, 8):  
 
The matching of rules to situations rests on the logic of appropriateness. Actions 
are chosen by recognizing a situation as being of a familiar, frequently 
encountered, type, and matching the recognized situation to a set of rules… The 
logic of appropriateness is linking to conceptions of experience, roles, intuition and 
expert knowledge. It deals with calculation mainly as a means of retrieving 
experience preserved in the organizations files or individuals memories. 
 
Determination of the rules which guide the activity of agents would typically require interviews with 
the agents of the system. Applying this to procurement then requires an investigation of the rules 
about the procurement system and the rules of interaction within the system. As noted in the 
introduction there are a large number of decisions which need to be made in any procurement 
activity. Two key sets of rules relate to decisions concerning the institutional arrangements 
(interaction rules) involved in delivering the engineering asset, and in decisions concerning the 
engineering asset itself (system rules).  
 
 
 
Interaction rules in procurement of engineering assets   
As noted above, the determination about which agents are permitted to participate in a given arena 
is governed by a range of ‘rules’ about the system itself. Information concerning the role 
government agencies are permitted in the procurement process would be elicited from policy 
documents and interviews. The determination of which private agents are permitted to tender for 
engineering procurement would be elicited by examining policy documents, interviews and various 
mechanisms such as prequalification schemes.  
 
System Rules in procurement of engineering assets 
In terms of decisions concerning the engineering asset itself, there are three well recognised and 
competing rules for engineering assets: price, quality and cost. These rules are seen as 
competing, and project management literature argues that all three requirements cannot be 
achieved at any given time. For example, if the decision is made to deliver a ‘gold-plated’ solution 
(one of very high quality) then time and cost are likely to increase. Likewise, if time is of the 
essence, then quality and cost are likely to be affected.  As noted above, validation and elicitation 
of additional rules would require interviews with key informants.  
 
According to Holland (1995), from a relatively simple set of rules, a surprising amount of diversity is 
possible within a system.  So establishing the key rules which influence procurement decision 
making are an important part of this research project. However, rules for the procurement of 
engineering assets (such as price, quality and time) can be seen to be in tension with each other. 
Agents must make choices between these alternatives, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
Choosing between alternatives (also termed the fitness function)  
As noted above, CAS theory argues that there are often competing rules in a system, and agents 
must choose between them. Choosing between alternatives is determined by what is termed the 
fitness function. Fitness functions govern how the agent will choose among alternative actions 
(Gell-Man 1984; Holland 1998). The most appropriate rules, (i.e. the ones that ‘work’) are the ones 
that tend to be reinforced – as they have a high level of fitness for agents in relation to the 
‘landscape’. A biological example is the choice of fight or flight for animals – the most appropriate 
choice is determined by what threat the organism is facing. This concept of a ‘fitness function’ is 
similar to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ outlined by March and Simon (1993), as organisations and 
individuals make choices based on past experience and learning about what the most appropriate 
action would be in a given circumstance. This concept of learning and reinforcement of rules is 
explored in the section on adaptation below.  
 
In procurement, little research has been undertaken to date to understand how individual agents 
choose between differing procurement alternatives in government, with preliminary work 
suggesting that ‘decision trees’ are employed to make various procurement choices (Lædre et al. 
2006).  In this project, having determined the agents in the procurement system, and the rules they 
operate by, how the agents make choices between alternative procurement methods needs to be 
elicited, which is most likely possible through semi-structured interviewing. Thus the first key 
element of examining procurement of engineering assets from a CAS perspective is to identify the 
agents, their rules and how they choose between these rules.  
 
CAS theory holds that the order in a system emerges from the interaction of agents based upon 
rules which are outlined in the next section.  
Self-organisation (also termed emergence) 
The structure and dynamics of a CAS are a result of choices by the agents, as they learn and 
adapt to actions of other agents (Albino et al., 2005). In other words there is no formal order 
imposed from outside of the CAS, and order emerges from the interactions between the agents at 
a local level (Stacey and Griffin 2005, 7). “Emergence is the term used in CAS theory to describe 
the phenomena of patterns at a higher level of abstraction that arise from interactions among lower 
level agents” (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003, 63).  
 
That a complex process can be self organising is not new in and of itself. Adam Smith (1971) 
introduced the notion of the ‘invisible hand of capitalism’ where markets were efficient yet were 
governed by laws of supply and demand, not government. What is relatively new is the application 
of this concept to management (Clippinger 1999, 2). Klijn and Teisman (2007) argue that notions of 
self-organisation have parallels in institutional theory with its idea that structures emerge from 
interaction of agents, as they interpret and use institutional rules. CAS models are inherently multi-
level as the order is seen as an emergent property which results from lower levels of aggregate 
behaviour (Anderson 1999). No application of CAS to public policy has yet been able to 
demonstrate this multi-level nature of CAS to date. This research project will explicitly attempt to 
identify the multiple levels involved in engineering assets procurement as part of each case study.   
 
Daneke (2005, 95) argues that “the primary feature of social systems thinking is its focus on those 
elements that ‘emerge’ from the interactions of agents and institutions”. Emergence is seen to be 
both a product of structures and relationships. For example, Auyang (1998, 176) argues that 
“emergent characters mostly belong to the structural aspects of the systems”. Holland (1998, 121-
122), on the other hand, argues that “emergence is above all a product of coupled, context 
dependant interaction. Technically these interactions, and the resulting system, are nonlinear. The 
behaviour of the system cannot be obtained by summing up the behaviours of its constituent parts 
… unless we take the nonlinear interactions into account”. Consequently, emergence must study 
the analysis of the parts as well as the interactions between the parts as “we will not understand 
these complex systems until we understand the emergence phenomena that attend them” (Holland 
1998, 4).  
 
The structure of agents interacting in governmental arenas has been of growing concern to public 
policy researchers – particularly those research the various modes of governance: hierarchy, 
network and market (Brown and Keast 2007). Boisot and Child (1999) argue that these different 
organising arrangements are the main mechanisms2 by which agents in CAS cope with 
complexity. After many years of research and theorising, markets, hierarchies and networks 
been accepted as the fundamental, different modes of organising (Rhodes and MacKechnie 20
Rhodes (1997) argued that the effective delivery of government services relies on ensure the right 
mix of these arrangements. Unfortunately, the right ‘mix’ for differing circumstances is difficult to 
identify.  In this context, network arrangements are seen to be informal shadows of formal systems 
(Smith and Stacy 1997). The interaction between the formal (hierarchy) and informal (network) 
systems produces emergent order, which may or may not be in line with the intentions of those in 
authority (Smith and Stacey 1997). As Meek et al. (2007, p.24) have argued “administrative 
networks, shared governance, and co-production of public services developed in the conjunctive 
state, are real-world examples of the emergent properties of complex adaptive systems”.  
have 
03). 
 
The implications of the concept of emergence for this research project are that lower levels of 
interaction result in order at the same level and also higher levels of order. Consequently the 
interaction of agents is held in CAS theory to result in higher levels of order and this ‘emergence’ of 
order should be explored as part of the research project.  
 
Emergence of higher order structures in the procurement arena have emerged in Australia, with 
the formation of groups such as the Australian Procurement and Construction Council (APCC) and 
the Australian Asset Management Collaborative Group (AAMCoG). While the APCC does not have 
executive powers, it provides a forum for “knowledge sharing, intelligence gathering and has the 
information networks to draw on for formulating solutions” (APCC 2008), and was established 
following interaction from state and territory jurisdictions. Similarly AAMCoG exists to facilitate 
collaboration and knowledge sharing in the area of asset management (CIEAM 2006). Tilebein 
(2006) advanced a cogent explanation of the phenomena of emergence in organisations while 
studying supply chain management. An adaptation of Tilebein’s (2006) model is given in Figure 2 
below, and depicts emergent order as applied to government agencies and private firms and 
associations involved in procurement. 
 
Figure 1 – Emergence of order in organisational contexts (adapted from Tilebein 2006, 1097).  
 
 
 
Consequently the case studies would also need to explore the notion of emergence in the 
interviews – seeking to identify higher levels of order, often new institutions or organisations which 
have emerged from interactions at lower levels of action.  
                                                          
2 Boisot and Child (1999) use the terms fief and clan in stead of the term networks. The term network has been retained as it is the 
term commonly used in a range of literatures (e.g. Rhodes 1997; Keast, Brown and Mandel 2006).  
Co-Evolution 
In a CAS, agents are seen as being interconnected so that the behaviour of an agent is influenced 
by the behaviour of other agents in the system. As one agent changes, so does the other – hence 
the understanding of co-evolution. It is this interconnectedness of agents which distinguishes CAS 
models from other systems models. For example “in systems dynamic models, variables are 
connected to each other by feedback loops; in CAS models, agents are connected to one another 
by feedback loops” (Anderson 1999, p. 219 italics in the original).  The notion of co-evolution has 
particular purchase for decision making in networks “where experiences and choice influence each 
other because of learning processes” (Klijn and Teisman 2007, 9). Morgan (1997) refers to this 
process as mutual causality and provides and example in the “mad cow” problem which decimated 
an industry in Britain.  
 
Figure 2 – How decisions by one agent influence other agent’s decisions (Morgan 1997, 279) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The idea that agents, their rules and their interactions co-evolve in CASs has been outlined above. 
One way of applying this to procurement system is that in organisations and markets, the least-fit 
element of systems tend to be eliminated – organisations replace their least efficient members, and 
least efficient firms in an industry tend to go out of business (Anderson 1999). A new agent drawn 
at random is likely to have a higher average fitness that the weak one replaces, which sets of 
changes in relationships between agents and can cause a cascade of changes in co-evolutionary 
adaptation in the system. With new actors, or new rules, or new relationships between actors, this 
causes a cascade of changes in the system.  
 
Consequently, changes to the participants in a system, or their rules would need to be examined 
through interviews and reference to secondary data such as prequalification schemes in order to 
explore the concept of co-evolution.  
Adaptation, Recombination, and Evolution  
Adaptation in CAS occurs due to changes in the environment, the choices of agents and often a 
dynamic feedback between these two. When the environment of the system changes, so does the 
behaviour of it agents and as a result, the behaviour of the system as a whole – in other words – 
the system learns and adapts to the new environment (Lewin and Regine 2003). CAS also evolves 
over time through the entry, exit, and change of agents, as well as changes in the linkages 
between agents (Anderson 1999). The structure and dynamics of a CAS  are a result of choices by 
the agents, as they learn and adapt to actions of other agents (Albino et al., 2005). Chapman 
(2000) argues that learning is a critical issue which is enabled by systems approaches to policy 
problems.  
 
Research into engineering asset procurement from a CAS perspective therefore needs to examine 
how the procurement system (the agents, their relationships, and/or the rules) have changed over 
time, due to either the choice of agents, or changes in the environment.  
 
In order to demonstrate the concept of self-organisation for procurement policy is perhaps best 
illustrated by drawing on extant research of the author, together with the underpinning adaptation 
and co-evolution of systems. In Furneaux et al. (2006) a summary of variant procurement 
approaches for public works in Australia was advanced. In the course of completing this research, 
it was evident that the procurement system in many states had recently changed from that which 
followed the widespread introduction of contracting out in Australian jurisdictions, and this was 
largely driven by interaction with construction firms and client agencies, or by changes in the 
environment.  Figure 1 provides and initial conceptualisation of this:  
 
Figure 3 - Initial conceptualisation of Policy Emergence 
 
Procurement Policy 
Procurement of specific 
assets 
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Summary  
Following Rhodes and MacKechnie (2003) it is proposed that an investigation into CAS in public 
policy might be operationalised by firstly undertaking a description of the agents of the system. 
Identifying who the agents are, and the nature and level of connections between agents, are key 
building blocks to understanding the nature of a system and how it operates and helps to identify 
the state of the system (Holland 1995). This is likely to be achieved by starting with the list of 
suppliers who are pre-qualified to deliver a particular type of engineering asset, and the 
government agencies which are responsible for the procurement of such assets. The next step is 
to examine the schemata (or rules) by which the agents make decisions, the way agents decide 
which decisions to take notice of, and the process by which rules change (Rhodes and 
MacKecknie 2003). An example of this might be under what circumstances an alliance 
methodology is chosen for construction of an asset. Investigation of policy documents suggests 
that alliance contracts are often used in highly complex infrastructure projects such as dams (New 
South Wales Treasury 2005), although this does not explain why private firms would decide to 
participate in such arrangements. A related activity is to examine how agents choose between 
different options (Holland 1995). An example of this might be to ask agents how they decide to 
tender or participate in design-construct arrangements, as opposed to design–construct-maintain 
arrangements. The final steps would be to identify how the system acts in relation to other systems 
in the environment, and how the system adapts and learns over time (Smith and Stacey 1997).  An 
example of this is the recent changes of many smaller government agencies who recently 
centralised procurement in response to changes in the environment (Furneaux, Brown, Allan, 
McConville, McFallan, London and Burgess 2006b).  
 
These key areas are stated below as formal research objectives.  
Research aim and objectives  
o The aim of this research is to use CAS theory as a framework to develop a richer 
understanding of engineering asset procurement systems.  
 
In order to deploy CAS theory in this context, it is necessary to identify the key elements of such a 
system and how they operate. As outlined in the literature review above, these include:  
o Identifying the central agents of the engineering asset procurement system 
o How do these agents elements interact 
o The rules which guide decisions made by these agents  
o The tension(s) between rules and agents  
o How are these tensions resolved? (which one ‘wins’ and why)  
o Changes (emergence) in the engineering asset procurement system to changes in 
the environment or decisions of agents? 
 
Significance   
Yin (2003b) suggests that there can be three areas of significance for research: contribution to 
knowledge in the area, to policy and to practitioners.  
 
To knowledge in the area 
Various authors have called for the application of CAS perspective to understanding policy 
processes (Bovaird 2007; Klijn and Teisman 2007; Meek, de Ladurantey and Newell 2007; 
Richardson 2006; Sanderson 2000; Stewart and Ayres year) although empirical investigations are 
few.  
 
Through Complex Adaptive System models and empirical verification, the 
black box of public service systems may become more transparent, thereby 
progressing our understanding of the link between agent decisions, agent 
interactions and system outcomes (Rhodes and MacKechnie 2003, 80). 
 
By demonstrating the utility of CAS theory in explaining the outcomes of procurement systems, an 
alternative theoretical model of policy development processes within government can be 
developed.   
 
To policy 
The implications for policy are far reaching. Many procurement approaches assume simple 
relationships between principal and agent, and consequently may not take into consideration 
adaptation and change in the system itself. A better understanding of the procurement of 
engineering assets is likely to lead to a better understanding of how to manage the problems 
encountered within these systems (Smith and Stacey 1997). While not seen as an intervention in 
and of itself, by developing a model of the system it is possible this can lead to changes at a policy 
level, as the influence of various forces becomes apparent (Wolstenholme 1992). Mass (1986) has 
argued that models of system are sufficiently accurate, they can move decision makers towards a 
deeper conceptualisation of the impact of their policy choices, and thereby lead to a change in their 
choices. Improved procurement choices should result in enhanced economic and social benefits 
for stakeholders.  
 
To practice  
Similar to the policy implications, an improved understanding of the nature and dynamics of a 
system can lead to improved outcomes for participants as assumptions are tested and improved 
and improved understanding can lead to better ways to address problems encountered in the 
system (Smith and Stacey 1997). As noted in the problem section above, some of the key 
problems affecting the procurement system at the moment are rising costs, and lack of skilled 
labour. The private sector should also benefit as depiction of the procurement system will enhance 
their participation as agents in that system – particularly the rules by which the system operates, 
and how change occurs in the system.  
 
By examining engineering asset procurement from a CAS perspective, it is thus anticipated to 
advance theoretical and practical knowledge of how such arrangements can be governed and 
effectively managed.  
 
Methodology  
 
As noted in the preceding sections, this research project seeks to apply CAS thinking to research 
into the procurement of engineering asset management. Given the note of caution raised by 
Mitleton-Kelly (2003) concerning the importance of testing the applicability of the assumptions of 
CAS theory to public administration the overarching methodological approach to the research will 
be that of a series of qualitative case studies, which will examine separate examples of the 
procurement of engineering assets. Each case study will answer the research objectives outlined 
above by seeking to identify each of the agents in the system, how they interact with each other, 
the rules which underpin their behaviour how the system adapts and changes, and if higher order 
emergent structures can be identified. In order to explore these elements, initially a series of 
interviews will be undertaken with key informants to identify their goals, rules, and interactions with 
other agents. From these initial sets of interviews, initial models of the system will be developed. A 
series of focus groups with key informants will then test and refine these models, in order to 
explore the functioning of the system as a whole, particularly interaction, adaptation and feedback 
within the system, and how the system and its rules change over time. Once each of the case 
studies has been completed, cross case comparisons can occur to elicit similarities and differences 
between the cases. These methodologies are discussed in detail below.  
 
Case studies 
Case studies provide for in-depth analysis of a particular issue or technology as it impacts an 
organisation or industry, and can provide strong recommendations for improvements in theory, 
technology or policy. Case studies in the area of policy have been called for as a way of advancing 
public policy practice (Osborne and Brown 2005, Stake 2005). Given the dearth of existing work 
undertaken in CAS research for public policy (Klijn and Teisman 2007) an exploratory case study 
methodology (Babbie 2004, 87–88) is appropriate. This is because a series of case studies can 
develop the application or understanding of theory to an area (Eisenhardt 2002) such as has been 
advocated for CAS and public policy (Daneke 2005).     
 
A case study is “a method for learning about a complex instance, based on a comprehensive 
understanding of that instance obtained by extensive descriptions and analysis of that instance 
taken as a whole and in its context” (U.S. General Accounting Office 1990, cited in Mertens 
2005:237). The objective of conducting multiple cases is to examine particular phenomena in 
multiple contexts in order to understand how, when and why it occurs (Huberman and Miles 1994).  
Multiple cases can enable powerful explanation of a particular process if the research is carefully 
ordered (Huberman and Miles 1994). Additionally, the multiple case studies enhance the 
generalisability of findings back to theory or policy (Yin 2003a), due to the fact that the same 
phenomena are investigated in multiple contexts (Schofield 2002).  
 
Therefore multiple case study approach for examining systems such as the procurement of 
engineering assets, has both been called for by leading authors and appears appropriate.  Such an 
approach is held to have utility due to the lack of research in the area and have been explicitly 
called for as a way of processing understanding of complex adaptive systems in general (Holland 
1995) and also in the application of CAS theory to specific industry contexts (Herder and Verwater-
Lukszo 2006). A multiple case study framework will enable a better understanding of the 
phenomena of engineering asset procurement from a CAS perspective.   
Sample 
Sampling within qualitative research is not necessarily based on random sampling, as often a 
specific instance or example is being examined in detail. For this project, selection of cases will be 
theory based – as the issue is to find examples of policy situations in which CAS theory can be 
used to elaborate and examine these cases (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
 
In order to gain access to specific cases, the partners of the CRC funding this research project, the 
Centre for Integrated Engineering Asset Management (CIEAM), will be approached initially. These 
include: 
o Defence: ASC, DSTO,  
o Electricity: Delta Electrical, Electrical Supply Authority 
o Water: Sun Water 
o Other partners: Queensland Rail, Rio Tinto, ANSTO, Commerce Queensland.  
 
Given that the subject of the cases are engineering assets, it is quite likely that different 
methodologies or processes are in place for procuring different types or classes of assets. For 
example, evidence suggests that the procurement of dams in South East Queensland is almost 
always delivered via an alliance contract, whereas the procurement of public buildings would not. 
Major roads contracts are often delivered via competitive tendering arrangements, although 
alliance contracts have also been used in specific instances; whereas smaller maintenance 
contracts are almost always via sole invitee arrangements (Queensland Department of Main 
Roads 2006). For larger assets such as certain military equipment or types of power station, it is 
also likely that there are very few suppliers able to tender for specific types of assets, which may in 
turn affect the procurement process. Consequently, cases shall be selected in order to represent a 
number of different asset classes (such as defence, transport - roads and rail, and utilities - water 
and electricity).  As examples of case studies would be the procurement and establishment 
processes involved in the South East Queensland water grid, the recent privatisation of electricity 
delivery in South East Queensland, or defence procurement.  
 
In attempts to resolve the water crisis, a large number of discrete projects are underway which are 
designed to work together in order to collectively improve the supply of water to Brisbane, one of 
which is the provision of a desalination plant. This case study explores the use of multiple 
contracts, and multiple assets to address a specific problem. A second case study is the recent 
contracting of electricity supply in South East Queensland, where government retained the 
generation of electricity, but contracted the supply of electricity to private firms in order to fund the 
ongoing water crisis. Another pertinent case study is the procurement of the new frigate for the 
Australian navy, which involves a single, large, long term contract, and the investment of significant 
amounts of capital into the development of economic and social infrastructure around the naval 
base in order to promote industry development (Furneaux and Brown 2007b).  The different type of 
actors involved in each case study and the role they take, is outlined below:  
 
Table 3 - Types of actors involved in potential case studies 
 Water (in SE Queensland) Electricity (in SE 
Queensland) 
Defence 
Production  Both private and public 
actors 
Public Private 
Supply  Public  Private Private  
Deployment  
(applies to defence 
only) 
  Public  
 
Sampling within each of the case studies would identify all of the key agents in the CAS. Rule-
based action and matching of appropriate action to recognised situations on the other hand, is 
seen as the province of experienced decision makers – experts, who have developed capability in 
a particular area over time (March and Simon 1993, 11). Snowball sampling of key informants is 
seen as particularly important for research involving policymakers (Farquharson 2005). The 
snowball sampling approach is useful for exploring sets of relationships, as agents in the system 
are aware of each other, and thus will not exclude any important agents (Milward and Provan 
1998). Agents will be identified from existing information and asked to nominate additional 
organisations not on the original list, thus following a snowball methodology. An example of this 
would be in the prequalification supplier arrangements which determine who is eligible to contract 
for the provision of particular engineering assets.   
 
The sample size of interviews in qualitative research is determined by theoretical saturation – once 
there is no new data coming forward in interview or in focus groups,  then there is a probability that 
theoretical saturation has been reached (Bryman and Bell 2001: 372).   
Unit of analysis  
Typically in organisational studies the unit of analysis focuses at a specific level, as an organisation 
is viewed as a level above the individuals that form it; and the organisation is in turn below 
economic and governmental forces which are seen as above and beyond the organisation and the 
individuals which comprise it (Stacey and Griffin 2005). For systems analysis such discrete 
analysis is problematic as “processes within an organization shape the external world, even as it is 
being shaped by that world” (March and Simon 1993, 17). A hallmark of systems research is the 
exploration of multiple agents and levels of action within a system (Holland 1995). Hitchins (2003, 
80) argues that all systems are in fact comprised of subsystems so every system is a “system of 
systems”. Holland states this another way by noting there are multiple levels within systems 
(Holland 1998, 9) and higher order systems are built up from a combination of lower level systems 
(Holland 1995). This concept of emergence was discussed in detail above. Given that all of the 
different elements identified above appear to interact with each other, and influence each other, 
then not only does this fit with the description of what a system is and how it operates, but also 
helps to solve the unit of analysis question.  
 
Systems dynamic models typically seek to examine the output of the system as a whole, rather 
than the individual actions of individual agents (Robertson 2005). Lewin and Regine (2003, 169) 
argue instead that the correct unit of analysis for systems research is the interactions or 
relationships between people and between organisations. Hitchins (2003, 34) notes that 
government systems are both frameworks of rules created by humans to regulate human 
behaviour; as well as groups of people who design and implement change and are changed by the 
systems they have helped to create. Thus the study of systems must study the parts, as well as the 
interactions between the parts (Holland 1998, 13). Holland (1995) suggests that at least two tiers of 
analysis are needed in order to understand systems of any sort – one which models the set of 
relationships and the flow of resources between agents at one level, and the other a higher level 
which sets out the rules for interaction and adaptation of the system itself.  
 
Consequently the unit of analysis is the procurement system – the range of agents, the external 
environment, the rules by which decisions are made – all of the elements of the system which were 
noted in the literature review. It is contended that these factors – the environment, the interaction 
rules and rules about the system, together with the roles of individual agents and emergent 
structures are all important to understanding the system, and to explore the set of relationships, as 
well as the rules and the adaptation involved in the CAS.   
 
The following section outlines research tactics in the areas of systems thinking and system 
dynamics research, which it is proposed will enable effective answering of the research questions 
– and is particularly important for the identification of the various agents in a system, how they 
interact and how they adapt and change. Secondly the sections that follow provide an overview of 
how to develop models of systems through focus groups, which is held to greatly improve the 
validity of research into systems, and therefore enhances the understanding of system dynamics.  
Systems dynamics research  
Anderson (1999) argues that complexity thinking provides a significant and powerful new 
perspective for researchers to examine decision making within organisations. As noted above, 
CAS research has been advocated as a fruitful framework for examining decision making in 
engineering asset procurement. Researchers who examine complex systems typically attempt to 
model the dynamics of the system under investigation (Pidd 1996). A key reason for this is that the 
process of model building examines and helps to explain the complexity of the system which is 
being examined (Holland 1998, 4). Such a model would depict the behaviour of the system 
(Hitchins 2003), and decision-making within the system (Anderson 1999). This raises the question 
as to what is a model, as understood from within the complexity perspective of management. A 
succinct definition of a model which shall be used in this research:  
 
A model is a representation of reality which abstracts the features of the 
situation relevant to the question being studied. The means of 
representation may vary from a set of mathematical equations or a 
computer program to a purely verbal description of the situation, in which 
judgement alone is used to assess the consequences of various choices. 
(Quade and Boucher 1968, cited in Hoos 1981, 40).  
 
As with most business research, models of complex systems can occur in a variety of modes and 
methods, and can be divided into quantitative and qualitative approaches (Cohen 1999). Each has 
their own strengths and weaknesses, and applicability to different situations and contexts. An 
overview of qualitative and quantitative approaches to modelling CAS and their relevance to the 
examination of the procurement of engineering assets follows.  
  
Quantitative and qualitative approaches to modelling the dynamics of CAS  
Various authors have approached the computer simulation of policy outcomes from a quantitative 
perspective (e.g. Mass 1991). One reason given for this is that qualitative models can become too 
ambiguous and difficult to simulate manually (Sterman 1994). Against this, Hoos (1981) is strongly 
critical of social scientists developing computer models as though these are definitive 
representations of real world problems, and suggests that inevitably important factors under 
investigation will be neglected, thereby reducing the validity of the model of the system being 
developed. Emery (1981) also argues that mathematical models of complex systems ignore the 
vast complexity of human action and choices.  
 
Wolstenholme (1992) argues that having completed a qualitative system dynamics model, there is 
no pressing need to convert the model to a computer based application – as the diagram itself, if 
done properly, can promote thinking in its own right. Richardson (1999) has argued that the 
general trend in systems dynamic research is towards qualitative mapping approaches by 
themselves, without quantitative simulation. Coyle (2000) agrees arguing that a rigorous qualitative 
description of a system might be of significant value in and of its own right as it would lead to a 
better understanding of the problem.  
  
Given that research into nascent or little understood phenomena should utilise a qualitative, 
explorative approach to the research problem (Edmondson and McManus 2007), this project will 
use a qualitative approach to model the dynamics of engineering asset procurement as a CAS.  
 
Qualitative approaches to the modelling of systems, however, come in various sub-types, with Soft 
Systems Methodology (Checkland 1981, Coyle and Alexander 1997), system dynamics (Forrester 
2007) and complexity theory (Klijn and Teisman 2007) all prevalent in studies of organisational 
systems (Jackson 2003).   
 
Soft systems methodology (SSM) is held to be an effective tool which can be used to model a 
system (Bergvall-Kåreborn, Mirijamdotter, and Basden (2004).  However, Stacy and Griffin (2005) 
argue that SSM is intractably linked to participant observation and action learning methodologies 
which seek to change the system in which the research is a part. Given that the research problem 
being explored is focussed on exploratory research, then qualitative approaches which explicitly 
set out to change a system from the outset, such as SSM, would not be appropriate. Instead 
research approaches which explore complexity and the dynamics of adaptive systems will be used.   
 
Complexity and systems dynamics approaches 
Systems dynamics approaches do not set out to attempt to change the system which is being 
modelled. However, the very process of undertaking the research will generate causal loop 
diagrams (discussed below) to participants. Mass (1986) argues that if these models of the system 
are sufficiently accurate, it may move decision makers towards a deeper conceptualisation of the 
impact of their policy choices, and thereby lead to a change in their choices. This feedback 
process is a process termed double loop learning, which is outlined in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 is 
in fact an example of a causal loop diagram which is a central element in complexity thinking and 
system dynamic models.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Double loop learning and decisions (Sterman 2000, 19)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causal loop diagrams 
Causal loop diagrams were used to depict the basic causal mechanisms that were seen to underlie 
behaviour of agents in the system (Randers 1973, 1980). Hitchins (2003) argues that causal loop 
diagrams help to depict complex problems – particularly the elements, and behaviour of systems. 
Causal mapping is an important way of depicting the relationships and influences between parts of 
a system (Brock, Chesbro, Cragan and Klumpp 1973), and both Hitchins (2003) and Sterman 
(2000) argue that causal loop diagrams are important tools for demonstrating feedback in systems.  
Miles and Huberman agree, stating:  
 
A causal network is a display of the most important independent and dependant 
variables in a field of study and of the relationships among them (1994, 153) 
 
Causal maps can be built from the ground up, or commence from an initial set of assumptions, and 
can be amended following information provided by informants, with the latter generating results at a 
faster rate (Miles and Huberman 1994). Causal maps can be used for both within case analysis and 
between case analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994), which is important for this study, as it explores 
multiple cases of engineering asset management and maintenance procurement systems. An 
example of a causal loop diagram was provided in the literature review in order to explicate the 
issue of co-evolution (Figure  
 
Wolstenholme (1999) argues that qualitative modelling of systems dynamics through causal loop 
diagrams enables participants to externalise mental models of the system in question. Cognitive 
mapping is an important approach to understanding and depicting the mental models of decision 
makers (McDonald, Daniels and Harris 2004).  How these mental maps of CAS might be elicited is 
discussed below.  
 
Mental maps and models of complex systems  
Farsides (2004) argues that cognitive mapping is a process which aims to develop a better 
understanding of people’s worlds and how they conceptualise the various concepts which might 
comprise such a world. Morecroft (2004) argues that mental models are important for developing 
an understanding of how pieces in a system fit together, how the parts interact with each other. 
Anderson, Meyer, Eisenhardt, Carley and Pettigrew (1999) suggest that it is important to map 
agent’s mental models in complex systems, together with the ties that connect them together. 
Edkins, Karul, Maytorena-Sanchez and Rintala. (2007) note that cognitive mapping tools are 
extremely valuable in mapping complex managerial environments, suggesting that that NVIVO for 
data coding and Decision Explorer for the diagrammatic representation of relationships between 
concepts. Brock et al. (1973, 50) argues that mapping of mental models should include: the agents 
within a system; the relationship between these agents; their goals; the rules by which they make 
decisions; the outcomes of the interactions between agents in comparison to their goals.  
 
The specific methodologies advocated for garnering this information include semi-structured 
interviews, content analysis of the interviews and concept mapping (Farsides 2004; Edmondson 
and McManus 2007). Vennix (1999), Luna-Reyes, Martinez-Moyano, Pardo, Cresswell, Andersen, 
and Richardson (2006) and Ackermann and Eden (2004) agree but suggest that in addition to 
interviews and qualitative text analysis, mapping through focus groups enables generation of more 
complex maps as respondents are able to see each other’s models and adapt the final diagram. 
This process is similar to that advocated by both Ford and Sterman (1998, 317) and Vennix and 
Gubbels (1992) who recommend eliciting the mental models of multiple agents through a staged 
process of firstly conducting interviews, mapping the concepts by researchers, and then checking 
the models with focus groups of experts in order to further test and refine the models.  
 
Thus eliciting experts’ mental maps requires the use of interviews and focus groups which fits well 
with a qualitative case study approach outlined above. Such mental maps are vital to 
understanding engineering asset management procurement from a CAS perspective – particularly 
the dynamics of the system – its agents, their rules and how the system interacts.  
 
Stated succinctly, the process for developing an understanding of CAS such as the procurement of 
engineering asset management for this project will be: 
 
o Conduct interviews with key informants and gather relevant documents on the process 
under examination 
o Identify key agents, goals, interactions, rules, and outcomes of interactions from these 
sources 
o Develop initial causal loop diagrams 
o Conduct focus groups to check and refine the models  
o Conduct cross case comparisons of the cases 
 
These steps are discussed in detail below.  
Data collection instruments and rationale 
In order to discover the elements and to model the CAS noted above, specific methodologies will 
be used to gather data: 
• Policy analysis and evaluation will identify the critical elements of engineering asset 
procurement, particularly the established ‘rules’ which might guide the procurement process  
• Semi-structured interviews will be utilised to develop a fuller understanding of the range of 
agents involved in the system, the roles they play, and the rules that they operate by.   
• Focus groups will be utilised in order to explore the mental models arising from the initial 
set of interviews in order to test and refine the concept and model of procurement as a 
system. Any differences between the rules available in the literature, and the rules of 
individual agents will be explored and commented on. 
 
As outlined above, such a process enables the eliciting the extent, nature, and functioning of CAS 
such as engineering asset management, together with the rules used by agents to make decisions.   
This project also uses multiple case studies, which Yin (2003b) argues should include multiple 
sources of evidence. Multiple methods of analysis are typical in case study research and allow for 
triangulation of data which is important in qualitative research to enhance validity (Eisenhardt 1989: 
537). In this case the original data set will be derived from the policy documents which explore the 
existing understanding of procurement as set out in practitioner and academic literature. The 
interviews will generate a set of raw data, exploring roles, relationships and rules involved in the 
procurement process. The primary data and the secondary data will then be examined, compared 
and contrasted. An initial model of the procurement process which arises from the two data 
sources will then be presented back to a focus group of nominated experts in the procurement 
process. The validity of the model will be explored with the focus group in order to test for 
situations and circumstances which might guide the use of a particular rule in a given situation, for 
a particular asset, and not in others.  
 
The specific methodologies of interviews and focus groups are discussed in detail below, together 
with triangulation between data sources.  
Semi-Structured Interviews  
Semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews will be conducted with all agents involved in 
the procurement of a particular engineering asset – clients, central agencies, lead contractors, sub-
contractors, funding bodies, and policy activists. Interviews provide the initial set of information 
about the CAS being examined, particularly the agents, their goals and their interactions with other 
agents. General information about the procurement of engineering assets system would also be 
generated from the interviews. Semi-structured interviewing was selected as it provides for cross-
case comparability (Bryman and Bell, 2001: 346), and is important when conducting exploratory 
studies – particularly in order to find out what is actually happening in practice (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill 2000: 245). Mitzberg (1979, 587) argues that semi-structured interviews are an 
important method to use in qualitative research such as is being undertaken in this project:   
 
Semi structured interviews provide key information about policy processes, as they allow for the 
telling of individual perceptions and understanding (Marinetto 1999: 72).  Interviewees will be 
provided with opportunities to review and correct interview summaries, by checking the data for 
accuracy, thereby strengthening the internal validity of the research (Mertens 2005).  
 
The information provided in the interviews will then enable the generation of initial model of the 
CAS being examined. These initial models will be tested and further refined in a series of focus 
groups.  
Focus Groups 
Focus groups are important in qualitative research as these allow for variance in the interpretation 
of issues by participants, and to understand the ways these differences are resolved and 
consensus is built (Mertens 2005). In a group interview the researcher acts as facilitator and 
manager of the discussion (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2000: 268). Focus group techniques 
have been noted above as an important method for testing and improving the mental models of 
engineering asset procurement systems developed from initial sets of interviews (Ackermann and 
Eden 2004).  
 
The sample size of focus groups would be four to six groups per case study, with 7 to 10 people 
per group. These numbers are considered acceptable for answering research questions in focus 
groups, although the numbers can be adjusted for specific research questions (Mertens 2005). 
Approximately four to five questions can be asked effectively in a given focus group, as opportunity 
for each member to participate is encouraged and discussion amongst group members will limit the 
amount of topics that can be covered in a single session (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran 2001).   
 
As noted above, the purpose of the focus groups is to explore the initial models of CAS developed 
following the interviews, and to allow for the further development and refinement of the models. 
This process is held to improve the validity of models (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
 
Individual informants will be de-identified and any commercial in-confidence information will not 
been divulged. All interviews and focus groups will be conducted in confidentiality, and the names 
of interviewees will be withheld.  The names of government departments, government reports, and 
most government policies will not be obscured as most of this information is already freely 
available, either on the Internet or in public libraries.  
 
Triangulation 
Triangulation can be used between the various data sources in order to clarify meaning, verifying 
the repeatability of the observation or interpretation (Stake 2005). Triangulation can enable a 
holistic understanding of the problem being investigated (Jick 1979), and minimises the risk of 
potential bias that may arise if only one methodology was used (Scandura and Williams 2000, 
1249). This project will undertake triangulation of data and method (Patton 1987, cited in Yin 
2003b). Data triangulation uses data from different sources in order to triangulate and look for 
differences. This is particularly important for model building processes. The sections above have 
outlined how the use of interviews and focus groups enable triangulation between methods in order 
to develop and test models of the system. Additionally, Yin (2003) argues that data can be 
triangulated between cases, thereby further enhancing generalisability. 
Data analysis 
Huberman and Miles (1994) argue that the first step in analysis is to provide a descriptive outline of 
what is happening in the case. Modelling engineering asset procurement from a CAS perspective, 
entails the description of the system, its’ agents and their interactions, and the dynamics of how 
each system operates. The extant literature and interviews will form the basis for the initial set of 
causal loop diagrams. The development of these causal loop diagrams follows a pattern of 
inductive reasoning which firstly observes the system, analysing patterns and themes, formulating 
relationships and then develops a theory (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran 2001), which in this 
case is a model of the system. Triangulation can be used between the various data sources in 
order to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of the observation or interpretation (Stake 
2003), which in this case is between the secondary data and the primary data. An iterative 
approach is followed where data is analysed until no alternative explanation can be found (Bryman 
and Bell 2001: 426).  
  
Within case analysis is the first step in coping with a large amount of data which can be generated 
in case study research (Eisenhardt 2002). Such analysis is aided through data displays which 
condense key incidents or elements of the study. The provision of a dialogue between ideas and 
evidence is important in the analysis phase, as it enables the opportunity of seeing relationships, 
themes, patterns and clusters of data, and affords the opportunity of developing explanations about 
such data.  
 
The initial models developed from document analysis and interviews will then be discussed in a 
focus group setting where the assumptions, relationships, rules and roles of each element of the 
system are examined and modified. In this study, this would require the structure and dynamics of 
each CAS to be elaborated, tested, refined and improved. The emerging constructs from the case 
studies of each system, are tested in relation to each case and whether they hold or are different 
for each case thereby strengthening the internal validity of the research (Eisenhardt 2002). The 
important process is to test for the validity of the model in the minds of the key informants who 
operate within the system on a daily basis.  
 
Once each case study has been finalised, cross case comparisons are possible, which strengthen 
the external validity of the research (Huberman and Miles (1994), and facilitate better understand 
of CAS (Holland 1995). During this phase of the research, there is a search for patterns of 
similarity or difference between cases, together with an iteration between data and emergent 
theory which is strengthened and built from multiple cases and multiple data sources (Eisenhardt 
2002). This process has been depicted by (Yin 2003b: 50).  
 
Figure 5 – Process for implementing a case study (Yinn 2003b: 50) 
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As the application of CAS theory is novel, the applicability of the theory to specific instances of 
engineering asset procurement will enable the testing of the theory in multiple contexts. By testing 
CAS theory in multiple cases within a single research project, cross case comparisons can be 
undertaken which enable the testing and building of theory (Daneke 2005). 
Summary of data collection stages  
A summary of how these methodologies could be utilised in the research project is outlined below:  
 
Table 4 - Summary of data collection strategies 
 Literature 
review / 
Qualitative text 
analysis  
Interviews Focus 
groups 
Comments 
Phase 1 – 
Identification of 
elements, agents, 
rules, roles and 
tension 
Identify factors 
in literature 
Gather policy 
documents  
Initial interviews to 
elicit rules, roles and 
relationships of 
agents in the system 
 Collate data for the 
development of the initial 
models.  
Phase 2 – 
Development of 
theoretical model 
    Initial analysis, synthesis 
and comparison of data. 
Development of initial 
model.  
Phase 3 – Validation 
/ improvement of 
the model  
Recheck the 
literature for 
any missing 
elements 
Interviews on 
specific case studies 
to clarify issues.  
Focus 
groups to 
clarify and 
improve the 
models 
Testing and modification 
of the models  
Phase 4 – cross 
case comparisons  
If needed If needed If needed Cross case comparison of 
the data, looking for 
similarities and differences 
between the cases in 
order to build theory 
Data depiction  
Displaying of data and analysis of data are often relates, as  robust explanation and depiction is 
likely to lead to better analysis. The literature on researching systems provides useful insights into 
the display and depiction of the agents in a CAS, and how they interrelate.  
 
Matrices and charts  
Components of the system need to be identified and explained – importantly that there may be sub-
components which act relatively independently of each other, and yet have an impact on the 
outcome as a whole (Brock et al. 1973, 62). N2 charts are forms of matrixes which are useful for 
depicting complex sets of relationships and interaction between different components of a system, 
such as the sharing of resources (information or financial) (Hitchins 2003) (see Figure 3 below).  
 
Figure 6 – An example of a N2 matrix (adapted from Hitchins 2003, 145)  
Sub-system A 0     
0 Sub-system B 0    
  Sub-system C 0 0 0 
  0 Sub-system D 0 0 
   0 Sub-system E 0 
   0 0 Sub-system F 
 
Gill (1996) argues that by firstly eliciting relationships from interviews and placing these onto a 
matrix form of diagram, relationships between parties can be identified. These can then be turned 
into system dynamics diagrams, causal maps, or other forms of network diagram. Richardson 
(2005) notes that from these matrixes it is possible to build network graphs of relationships 
between agents in a network, which will enable the understanding of the set of agents in a CAS 
and how they interrelate to each other.   
 
Developing of models through iteration 
As noted above, once the initial models have been developed, it is important to gain feedback from 
informants on the model under development in multiple times (Miles and Huberman 1994). The 
development of initial diagrams is an important first step in understanding and depicting the 
interaction and dynamics of the specific instance of engineering asset procurement from a CAS 
perspective. Wolstenholme (1992, 129) argues that the development of models which analyse 
system dynamics, should involve several iterations of the model. This process will be undertaken 
through the focus groups noted above. Homer (1996) argues that iteration is important in order to 
ensure the validity of the model, and that researchers should not be surprised if there are a number 
of stages to the development of a model process.  
 
Homer and Oliva (2001) argue that the model of a CAS needs to be revisited on numerous 
occasions, in order to ensure that the model replicates reality. As Sterman (1994) argues “without 
modelling we might think that we are learning to think holistically, when we are actually learning to 
jump to conclusions”.  Richardson (1996) argues that this process of checking the model with key 
informants of experts ensures the validity of the mental models. 
 
Data depiction and iteration of findings from informants are thus an important part of the process of 
developing a qualitative model of the engineering asset management procurement from a CAS 
perspective.  
  
Validity, reliability and generalisability  
Validity, reliability, and generalisability are hallmarks of good research, however, these aspects can 
be difficult to implement in qualitative studies.  Yin (2003b) outlines how validity and reliability can 
be enhanced in case study designs:  
o Construct validity – multiple sources of evidence, have key informants review drafts 
o Internal validity – pattern matching and explanation building, address rival explanations 
o External validity – use replication logic in multiple case studies 
o Reliability – use case study protocol, case study database 
o Transferability parallels external validity in quantitative studies, and relies upon multiple 
cases in the one study.  
 
As noted above, multiple sources of evidence will be used to improve the validity of constructs, and 
key informants will also be allowed to review summaries of interviews (Yin 2003b). By matching 
patterns across interviews and addressing rival explanations in the focus groups, internal validity 
will be strengthened (Yin 2003b). As multiple case studies will be used, replication of the same 
methodology and logic can improve the external validity, reliability and transferability (Yin 2003b). 
Thus the methodology, outlined above, by using multiple case studies, multiple sources of 
evidence and involving informants in checking interviews and modes, will improve the validity, 
reliability and generalisability of the findings (Yin 2003a).  
 
While it may not be possible to generalise from four case studies to every other case of 
engineering asset procurement due to the specific nature of each system (Klein and Teisman 
2007), it should be possible to generalise from the case studies back to theory (Yin 2003a). The 
Cooperative Research Centre for Integrated Engineering Asset Management (CIEAM) will provide 
a highly useful dissemination role by virtue of access to different industry partners which comprise 
the Centre   
Limitations    
Some data is likely to be sensitive and classified – depending on the nature of the research, or 
may not be able to be made public. This may possibly affect the selection, although certainly the 
reporting, of a specific case study. However, industry partners associated with CIEAM have 
indicated that they would be interested in participating in the research, with some indicating that 
they would facilitate access to their entire supply chain.  As noted in the sampling section above, 
the research will select across multiple asset classes in order to generate a better understanding of 
the various approaches to engineering asset procurement.  
Assumptions 
Industry partners with the CRC for Integrated Engineering Asset Management (CIEAM) have 
indicated interest in the project. The Department of Defence and the agency responsible for the 
Collins class submarines (ASC) have both expressed interest in participating. The Department of 
Defence is exploring CAS framework in a range of areas, including procurement. CIEAM has 
provided financial support to this project and will broker access to these research partners in order 
to facilitate access to research partners.   
 
Cooperation by industry and government is necessary in order to gain access to interviewees and 
focus group participants. If cooperation is not possible for various reasons then alternative case 
studies from other members of CIEAM will be substituted in place of those above.  
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